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What makes parties to armed conflicts comply with applicable law? The ICRC’s Roots of Restraint in War Study¹

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I feel humble as a non-lawyer amongst such a legal audience, presenting a report on how to influence the behaviour of soldiers and fighters to comply with international humanitarian law.

We explored the issue from a social science perspective and focused on understanding restraint in war: restraint being observable behaviour indicating a deliberate attempt to reduce violence. Instead of studying IHL violations and why they occur, a subject on which there has been a lot of work, we looked at cases of restraint, unpacking the sources of influence over that restraint – the levers controlling when violence was unleashed or contained. This approach has introduced a new lens through which to view the behaviour of armed actors and is very helpful for our policy work trying to curb the worst excesses of armed conflict.

The Roots of Restraint in War report, which was launched in June this year, is an update of the ICRC’s 2004 study, *The Roots of Behaviour in War*. The earlier study looked at individual combatant motivations for violating IHL and had important policy implications for the ICRC. Prior to this study, the ICRC had mainly focussed on disseminating knowledge of the law, but the study clearly showed that knowledge of the law was not

¹ This intervention includes the executive summary and chapter 2 of *The Roots of Restraint in War* study.

enough to ensure compliance with it, more needed to be done. The study recommended supporting the integration of IHL into the doctrine of armed forces or codes of conduct of armed groups, into training mechanisms – training trainers, considering the most effective forms of training – and into compliance mechanisms, making sure that breaches of IHL would be punished. So the ICRC has been following this approach for the last fifteen years.

When the suggestion came to update the 2004 study, we decided to do two things.

The first was to look at what impact the ‘integration approach’ had had on armed force behaviour. We, in the humanitarian world, are not very good at measuring the success or failure of what we do. So one of the main objectives of the new study was to get evidence of how the ‘integration approach’ worked. Can we find evidence that training actually makes a difference to battlefield behaviour?

The second issue of interest was to explore how the ICRC could influence the behaviour of the increasing number of non-state armed groups that do not have a centralised, vertical hierarchy allowing for the integration of IHL into doctrine, training or compliance mechanisms. More armed groups have appeared in the last six years than in the previous sixty and many of them, rather than fragmenting from a larger armed group, have arisen from neighbourhood associations or groups of friends, particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring. Many of these small armed groups consist of friends and acquaintances whose group forms alliances with other similar groups. From the outside, this alliance might be mistaken for a large armed group. But in reality, authority is decentralised – retained within the original small group. The study sought to understand how we might exert influence on these decentralised groups to respect the norms of IHL.

We also decided to expand our inquiry to ‘armed groups’ that would not be considered as such under IHL. Vigilante and self-defence militias and groups of armed cattle-guards – who are embedded in their communities – are sometimes responsible for significant amounts of violence in places like South Sudan and Nigeria. They lack the organisation structure necessary to be considered an armed group under IHL, melting back into their communities once an operation is finished. The humanitarian consequences of their violence warrants a closer look at sources of influence over their behaviour.

How did we go about the study? We engaged academic experts on armed group behaviour and asked them to compare two armed forces or groups in four category of group based on their organisational structure: integrated State armed forces; centralised non-state armed groups; decentralised non-state armed groups; and community-embedded armed


groups. We sought to identify the sources of influence over the development of their norms of restraint.

In the first category we compared the Philippines and Australian armies. For the second we looked to Colombia, examining the FARC and the ELN. The ELN is not a very centralized non-state armed group but they started out as one – so it was very interesting to look at variations between the groups and over time.

For the decentralised non-state armed groups we looked at Ansar Dine and MUJAO, two Islamist groups operating in Mali; and for the community-embedded category we looked at the Nuer and Dinka cattle-guarding groups in South Sudan.

I can't go into all the findings now with the limited time we have, but I think what might be interesting for you all are our findings on formal and informal mechanisms that influence behaviour. Until now, the ICRC has focused almost exclusively on formal socialisation mechanisms. By 'socialisation' I mean the way that individuals adopt the norms of a group. It is through a process of socialisation. The ICRC has been very active on the formal side through emphasising the rules, and training in those rules. But we are aware that there are also strong informal norms that influence behaviour. Investigations of IHL violations on the battlefield and in detention facilities often point to the importance of informal norms within the peer group - peer group pressure that can undermine formal teaching and formal rules.

One part of the study tried to unpack the relative importance of formal and informal norms on opinions and behaviour. Figure 1 below shows the results of a survey undertaken with the Australian army. I should add here that we have data from more than one thousand active combatants from the Philippine Army and four hundred from the Australian Army that was gathered through fascinating experimental surveys intended to reduce bias associated with the ICRC asking questions on IHL. The survey questions had few right or wrong answers, instead pitching dilemmas in choices between, for instance, force protection and civilian protection. Soldiers of different ranks were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with certain statements.



This graph shows results from part of the survey comparing informal and formal influences on opinions. There were four different survey forms and each of them contained slightly different information. This question asked the survey participant to advise his or her commanding officer on whether an operation should go ahead to take out a high-value bomb maker in a populated residential area of a town. In the control survey, seen on the left, no more information was given and, as you can see, there was solid agreement from both officers and other ranks that the operation should proceed, despite the risk of casualties among residents.

For the second survey, a further piece of information was given: that the military legal officer suggested that this action would violate IHL. So here we see a clear drop in agreement to the mission - but unfortunately for all the military lawyers among you - only to the level of ambivalence. It did not tilt opinions significantly into disagreeing with the mission, which is of concern and perhaps worth unpacking in itself.

The third version of the survey did not mention IHL but instead said that ‘50% of your peer group believe that this action would be unethical’. And as you can see there is a similar rate of drop off but also to the level of ambivalence.

The fourth version of the survey combined both additional pieces of information – the legal officer said it would violate IHL, and the peer group thinks it is unethical – and here you see the strongest change of heart but particularly among the officers.

This indicates to us that we have only been tackling half the equation by focusing exclusively on formal socialisation. Perhaps it is time for the ICRC to look into informal norms in the peer group and start to analyse, for

example, the words to marching songs, or some of the hazing practices and rituals that go on in armed forces and groups. Of course, some informal norms are good, such as the unspoken rule that ‘we never leave a man behind’. That’s an informal norm. But some others, I think, could be undermining the teachings of IHL. So, we, at the ICRC, are going to look further into this.

It was interesting to look at how norms are socialised in other groups - how rules were made on the ground. Our case study on Ansar Dine and MUJAO in two different places in Mali looked at the difference between these groups from when they were trying to take over the town, from when they were actually governing the town. We sought to understand how their norms and rules changed. It was very interesting to see the relationships with the population and how many of these rules were actually negotiable between the armed group and the population. Something else I found very surprising was that often the population was calling in the armed group. When I say the population, in the case of Mali, it was often people with business interests who wanted to keep their trafficking routes open, or wanted to secure their business interests, and felt that the Islamists had the best muscle to do so. But nevertheless, the rules were open to debate within the community it was sometimes the community asking for the toughest measures, such as chopping the hands off thieves. So for the ICRC, it was a good wakeup call. We should not be naïve about the role of communities, considering them only as innocents and under-estimating the influence they might wield over the behaviour of different armed groups. Perhaps we need to look at that a little more.

It was also very interesting to see that both MUJAO and Ansar Dine pledged allegiance to Al-Qaida, and yet their patterns of violence were very different. One group engaged in forced marriage and sexual slavery, the other didn’t. One engaged in summary execution, corporal punishment, etc. and the other didn’t. The other thing that really struck us was that it was not Al-Qaida imposing rules from the top and these local groups were obeying them. It was very much a two-way exchange process.

What we need to do now is aim for a deeper understand of possibilities to influence this process, which is already underway in some areas. Some of our ICRC colleagues are engaging with local influencers such as Imams, to try to understand the power and where it lies. But the fact that it changes rapidly and over time makes this very difficult.

Finally, one of the main overall findings from the study is that the law sets the standards of behaviour, and it’s very important that we keep talking about the law. But we need to go beyond an exclusive focus on the law and find the local traditions and the local religious texts that reflect the values underpinning IHL. We need to gain traction for the laws of war through talking about these things.

I will offer you an example of what I mean from South Sudan. In South Sudan wrestling is an important rite of passage with the Nuer, the Dinka and the Murle - it is a very popular sport. So, whilst conducting a first aid session for young men – those from the cattle camps responsible for quite a lot of violence -they like receiving first aid training as it's in their interests to be able to save their friends if injured – the ICRC staff member gets the guys talking about wrestling. Questions are asked about the rules. So, the fighters explain the rules very proudly and then the ICRC delegate acts a little stupid and says “I am not sure I completely understand your rules. Does that mean that you can challenge that woman over there sitting beneath the tree to a wrestling match?” Of course, the fighter laughs his head off thinking how stupid the foreigner is and answers: “Of course you can't. She is weak, she is no match for me.” The delegate goes on to ask: “Well, what about that child sitting over there?” The reaction of the wrestler is the same: “Of course you can't”. Engaging in this way opens a wonderful space to say: “Well it's the same when you are fighting. You must not attack the women, you must not attack the children because they are no match for you, it is not an honourable thing to do.”

We have a lot more work to do to find traction with the norms of IHL in this way. It's already going on but it's going to get additional impetus on the basis of the findings of the *Roots of Restraint in War* study.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the reference organization on international humanitarian law (IHL), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) seeks to ensure that the rules and norms aimed at restraining the destructive forces of armed conflict are known and respected by soldiers and fighters around the world. This report is a contribution to that endeavour.

The report, based on two years of research by a group of distinguished scholars, sets out to identify the various sources of influence on the behaviour of those bearing arms in different types of armed forces and armed groups. To date, the bulk of the ICRC's work in this domain has centred on State armed forces and on ensuring that IHL is incorporated into their doctrine and directives, into the regular training of soldiers and into the disciplinary mechanisms designed to enforce compliance with the rules. As such, it has focused predominantly on the formal norms prescribed by IHL.

The ICRC has also engaged with many non-State armed groups, encouraging them to adopt codes of conduct to align the behaviour of their fighters with the norms of IHL. But the nature of armed conflict has changed over the last decade, particularly in the proliferation of non-State armed groups that do not have a central hierarchical structure through which to transmit, and train members in, the rules of IHL. This has necessitated new research into how both formal and informal norms condition behaviour in the wide array of armed groups encountered in the ICRC's work, and how ICRC staff might promote restraint within their ranks.

This report draws on a rich body of empirical studies seeking to explain armed-group behaviour. Two constants stand out: first, there is considerable variation in the patterns of violence and restraint between and within armed organizations, and in the beliefs, mechanisms, resources and people that influence their behaviour; second, those variations may also change over time. Therefore, rather than formulating new directives for the ICRC to adopt in its dealings with armed forces and armed groups, the report offers a framework of analysis to assist its staff in situating armed groups on a spectrum according to their organizational structure. It further explains how the transmission and adoption of norms might occur in these groups depending on where they fall on the spectrum. The report then suggests approaches that might be adapted effectively to specific contexts.

CHAPTER 2

**INTEGRATED
STATE ARMED
FORCES**



2.1 CHARACTERISTICS

The key characteristics of integrated State armed forces are:

- Strictly hierarchical decision-making and authority
- Codified, observable rules that are consistently applied
- Observable signs of discipline (professionalism in uniforms, saluting, routines)
- Separation from civilian life when on duty.

Members of integrated State militaries make up the bulk of fighting forces around the world. Such forces have a strict vertical hierarchy through which authority flows from the leadership to the rank and file. Rules are laid out in doctrine, socialized through training and rituals, and enforced through threat of punishment. This does not mean, however, that members of State armed forces do not engage in unordered or unauthorized violence. Whilst State armed forces share much in common, there is variation between and within them in their socialization processes and sources of influence.

Not all State militaries are highly centralized. Some might be modelled on a centralized structure, wear uniforms with insignia, and display a certain amount of discipline. But a weaker central influence on the rank and file – owing, for example, to competing clan or ethnic loyalties or irregular payment of wages – will place some State militaries towards the right of the spectrum, with their sources of influence and methods of socialization closer to those of decentralized armed groups.

2.2 METHODS OF FORMAL SOCIALIZATION

Empirical studies have shown that training increases restraint on the battlefield.³⁰ But not just any training. Andrew Bell has found that intensity matters: conflict data from Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that US military units led by officers with more

³⁰ Andrew Bell, "Measuring the effect of norm socialization on the treatment of civilians: An analysis of U.S. army conduct in Iraq and Afghanistan", paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 31 August – 3 September 2017; Christopher H. Wamer et al., "Effectiveness of battlefield-ethics training during combat deployment: A programme assessment", *The Lancet*, Vol. 378, September 2011, pp. 915–924.

intensive training in norms of restraint engaged in less violence against civilians, even when controlling for combat leadership capability. Research conducted for this study similarly indicates that higher levels of IHL training result in greater adoption of norms of restraint by combatants in the Australian and Philippine armies.

However, training intensity is only part of the story: evidence from the Australian and Philippine militaries shows that mixed training methods, combining IHL briefings, classroom discussions, case-study reviews and practical field exercises, are the most effective in inculcating norms of restraint in combatants.³¹ The Australian Army's Royal Military College recently discovered the importance of testing ethical compliance under duress: during a week-long training exercise in which cadets were sleep- and food-deprived, instructors tried to enlist the cadets in simulated unethical and unlawful behaviour. Many acquiesced, demonstrating how fatigue and stress can lead to ethical breakdown. The cadets themselves were shocked when anonymized recordings of their actions were played back to them in the classroom and said that the experience had taught them more than any other of the need to develop a strong moral compass before facing the stress of the battlefield. Based on this experience, the Royal Military College has since instituted an intensive, model ethics training programme that incorporates training while under duress, which has been found to significantly enhance the adoption of norms of restraint by cadets.

Research also suggests that who it is who delivers the message makes a difference in the socialization process. For Australian and Philippine soldiers, an effective instructor in IHL requires credibility derived from operational experience: they need to be able to draw on the dilemmas they have faced and explain the choices they made. Conversely, some combatants may give greater credence to people of certain backgrounds with no combat experience but recognized IHL expertise: in the Philippines, junior soldiers highly rated training by civilian lawyers from the ICRC. Perhaps troubling for IHL training efforts, however, both Australian and Philippine soldiers generally rated poorly the training conducted by military legal officers, finding such officers to be generalists from higher echelons with no direct combat experience. Ultimately, such research points to the need to understand organizational context in order to identify the most effective training providers within an armed force.

Related research shows that the key moments to reinforce norms of restraint include during immediate pre-deployment briefings and, most importantly, in the wake of an incident in which a unit member has been injured or killed. Military expert David Kilcullen suggests that restraint must be reiterated by the unit leader as soon as it is feasible after the event: debriefings by army psychologists do not have the same impact.³² Reinforcing norms of restraint must take place down to the lowest level.

A further area of formal socialization explored in the research was the role of punishment in encouraging compliance with the law. Survey data and interviews with members of both the Australian and Philippine armies showed that the threat of punishment under domestic and military law exerts a much greater influence than that of punishment under "IHL" *per se*. This finding confirms the importance of integrating IHL norms into domestic law, standard operating procedures and rules of engagement. However, although the threat of punishment under internal military law had a strong influence on soldiers, particularly officers, this influence was surpassed by the socializing effect of informal norms and of "army values".

³¹ This chapter is based on empirical research undertaken with the Australian and Philippine armies by Andrew Bell.

³² Interview with David Kilcullen, Geneva, 29 November 2017.

2.3 INFORMAL SOCIALIZATION

The importance of the peer group's informal norms in shaping the attitudes and behaviour of soldiers has received considerable attention in recent decades, demonstrating that social bonds of "brotherhood" among soldiers invariably trump patriotism or ideology as a rationale to fight and kill.³³ Unwritten norms such as "never leave a man behind" are deeply ingrained in unit members across a wide range of State armed forces. Data from the Australian and Philippine militaries show the vital role of such informal norms and socialization processes.

The norm of brotherhood – or "mateship" in the Australian Army – is consistently cited across ranks as having a fundamental influence on the views and actions of soldiers. In interviews, soldiers noted that the decentralized nature of counter-insurgency warfare, in which small units fight at a distance from central command, further increases that influence. The bonds of brotherhood are especially pronounced among members of special forces, who operate in small, tightly knit units that act independently of conventional units.

The strength of informal norms in military forces is starkly illustrated in the persistence of sexual abuse and "hazing" rituals – the harsh and often humiliating initiation processes to which new recruits are subjected, ostensibly to forge group cohesion – in spite of military laws, reforms and disciplinary measures meant to stamp it out. Wood and Toppelberg's research on the US military points to informal mechanisms that trivialize sexual assault, establish it as an appropriate form of punishment, and condone retaliation against those who report it.³⁴ In Australia, 11 formal investigations, including several parliamentary inquiries, were undertaken into hazing and other forms of abuse in the Australian military between 1971 and 2009, and yet new cases of abuse continue to arise,³⁵ prompting a strong reiteration of values within the army.

Informal norms can be a double-edged sword, reinforcing or undermining official organizational norms.

Informal norms can thus be a double-edged sword, reinforcing or undermining official organizational norms. While there is no doubt that informal norms increase unit cohesion, this cohesion becomes problematic when unit members begin "protecting one another from the system, if or when you stuff up".³⁶ When loyalty to the group supersedes loyalty to the organization as a whole, witnesses to unethical behaviour are unlikely to come forward, compromising the ability of compliance mechanisms to ensure adherence to the rules.

Lastly, survey experiments tested what proportion of a combatant's peer group (25%, 50% or 75%) was needed to shift their opinion on conducting a hypothetical military

33 See, for example, Guy L. Siebold, "The essence of military group cohesion", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 33, No. 2, January 2007, pp. 286–295; Charles Kirke, "Military cohesion, culture and social psychology", *Defense & Security Analysis*, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 2010, pp. 143–159.

34 Elizabeth J. Wood and Nathaniel Toppelberg, "The persistence of sexual assault within the US military", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 54, No. 5, September 2017, pp. 620–633.


35 Richard Evans, "Hazing in the ADF: A culture of denial?", *Australian Army Journal*, Vol. X, No. 3, 2013, pp. 113–127, at 117.

36 Denny Neave and Craig Smith, *Aussie Soldier: Up Close and Personal*, Big Sky Publishing, Wavell Heights, 2008, p. 52.

operation that would result in heavy civilian casualties. For both the Australian and Philippine armies, the opinions of the peer group appear to play a significant role in shifting combatant views towards restraint, with diminishing effects over the 50 per cent mark. This suggests that those concerned with the promotion of IHL do not need to ensure that all members of a unit internalize norms of restraint; even adoption by half of the group or less can sensitize their comrades to the need to spare civilians.

Formal vs informal sources of influence

The graph below illustrates the comparative effects of formal mechanisms of IHL and informal mechanisms of peer-group influence on the preferences of officers and unit members in the Australian Army.



In a survey experiment, participants were asked to advise their commander on whether to target a high-value bomb-maker in a residential area. The hypothetical operation was likely to incur civilian casualties. The control survey gave no further information. Survey 1 added that the unit's legal officer advised that the operation would violate IHL. Survey 2 added that the majority of unit members believed that the operation was unethical. Survey 3 provided both sets of information.

It is interesting to note that Australian officers were more influenced by both IHL status and the opinion of their unit members than were enlisted soldiers. The graph clearly shows that the combined effects of the formal and informal socialization mechanisms had the greatest impact on shifting the views of the officers.

2.4 EMPHASIZING ETHICS

One way it seems that both the Australian and Philippine armies are trying to reconcile the formal and informal processes of socialization is by emphasizing “army values”: such values were frequently cited by all ranks as an important source of influence on behaviour.³⁷ These ethical values appear to play a strong complementary role to the law, a hybrid of formal and informal norms that aims to discourage unwanted behaviour not only because it is “against the rules” but also because it is “not who we are”. It is a hybrid in the sense that the values are not formally enforced in the way that the law is – unless behaviour that violates a value also violates the law – but career progression and respect within the organization clearly depend on the extent to which these values are embodied.

The use of values as a socialization tool in aligning behaviour to organizational norms was demonstrated by the Australian Army in 2013 when it added “respect” to its existing values of “courage”, “initiative” and “teamwork” in the wake of the above-mentioned sexual abuse scandals within the Australian Defence Force (ADF). In an appeal to soldiers’ ethical values, the then chief of army, Lieutenant General David Morrison, said at the launch of “respect”:

No one has ever explained to me how a coward in barracks is a hero
on operations. And bullies who humiliate their comrades are cowards
– as are those who passively watch victimisation without the moral courage
to stand up for their mates.³⁸

This appeal to personal honour resonated with soldiers from the Australian and Philippine armies. In the words of one Australian soldier, “you need to be able to look at yourself in a mirror” after the fight.

Thus, it is here that this study differs with the *Roots of Behaviour in War* conclusions, which opposed invoking moral values, arguing them to be relativist and unreliable, and instead advocated for a formalistic adherence to orders, discipline and hierarchy.³⁹ It posited that the combatant is not morally autonomous, although this contradicts rulings that do not allow the defence of “I was only following orders”. Military training does indeed seek to automate reflexes and limit the moral autonomy of individuals; however, survey and interview data suggest that value-based motivation can in fact be as powerful a motivator of combatant behaviour as the threat of punishment.⁴⁰

37 Amelia Hoover Green, “Armed group institutions and combatant socialization: Evidence from El Salvador”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 54, No. 5, September 2017, pp. 687–700; “The commander’s dilemma: Creating and controlling armed group violence”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 53, No. 5, September 2016, pp. 619–632.

38 Address by the chief of army, Lieutenant General David Morrison, AO, at the launch of the fourth value of the Australian Army – “Respect”, Lavarack Barracks, Townsville, 4 July 2013.

39 For a very thoughtful, longer critique of this point, see Dale Stephens, “Behaviour in war: The place of law, moral inquiry and self-identity”, *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 96, No. 895/896, December 2014, pp. 751–773.

40 In fact, the ICRC has not restricted its efforts to the law. In the 2016 commentary on Article 47 of the First Geneva Convention, footnote 4, refers to the *Roots of Behaviour in War* study and adds:

In order to be effective and to induce behaviour compliant with the law, international humanitarian law must not be taught as an abstract and separate set of legal norms, but must be integrated into all regular military activity, training and instruction. Such integration should aim to inspire and influence the military culture and its underlying values, in order to ensure that legal considerations and principles of international humanitarian law are incorporated, as much as possible, into military doctrine and decision-making.

This emphasis on organizational identity, “warrior’s honour” and ethical behaviour allows soldiers to internalize such norms of restraint, encouraging IHL compliance to a degree not possible through enforcement mechanisms alone. The internalization of norms beyond IHL-based punishments is all the more necessary in decentralized counter-insurgency warfare, where units operate far from commander oversight and the legal enforcement mechanisms of higher command.

The research found that there is a need for both the law and the values underpinning it, with the emphasis of each influence dependent on the target audience. The role of law is vital in setting the standards, but ensuring that the values it represents are internalized seems to be a more durable way of promoting restraint. Despite the increased legalization of military operations over the last decade – known as “lawfare” in some quarters⁴¹ – the words of British historian John Keegan still ring true, especially in counter-insurgency warfare:

There is no substitute for honor as a medium of enforcing decency on the battlefield, never has been, never will be. There are no judges, more to the point, no policemen at the place where death is done in combat.⁴²



41 There is even a blog dedicated to the topic: <http://www.lawfareblog.com>

42 John Keegan, cited in Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, Vintage, London, 1999, p. 118.

2.5 CHALLENGES TO SOCIALIZATION

The research also identified key issues that pose challenges to the socialization of combatants in norms of restraint. Perhaps the greatest challenge is the scepticism with which junior soldiers serving on the front line view abstract principles of law and ethics, particularly when confronted by the deadly risks they and their comrades face. Moreover, maintaining military adherence to IHL in the face of consistent violations by the opposing side remains a major obstacle to the observance of such principles on the battlefield. Hence, emphasizing the identity-based nature of restraint could help to encourage compliance in cases where soldiers question why they should respect IHL when their enemies do not.

Identifying methods to overcome this scepticism is thus a major challenge for those charged with promoting IHL and norms of restraint. Surveys and interviews show that the example set by junior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) has the greatest influence on junior soldiers' thoughts and behaviour. Such enlisted leaders must therefore be central to efforts to promote and transmit norms of restraint among junior soldiers within small operational units. In many ways, the junior NCO must become as much a partner in IHL training as the senior battalion commander, for it is only when officers at those levels adopt those norms that soldiers will experience formal and informal socialization.

Additionally, evidence from this study shows that religious identification can be an alternative focus for combatants' loyalty, particularly for Muslim soldiers for whom IHL resonates much less strongly than principles of Islamic law. To mitigate the potential for conflict between these two influences, trainers must emphasize the correlation between IHL and Islamic principles regarding restraint towards civilians and the prohibition of the use of certain means and methods of warfare, using language and references applicable to the particular context. The ICRC holds such seminars with State and non-State entities throughout the Muslim world, emphasizing the shared principles between the two systems and pointing out that Islamic law precedes IHL by over a millennium. In the Philippines, for example, a seminar on Islamic law related to armed conflict and IHL and Muslim customs and traditions was held in early 2018 at the Philippine National Police Center for Law Enforcement Studies in Quezon City.

2.6 IMPLICATIONS

This research demonstrates that the "integration approach" has considerable ongoing validity in seeking to shape the behaviour of combatants towards civilians, but it needs to be fully tailored to the audience, taught with intensity and tested under duress.

Some of the findings are at odds, however, with those of the *Roots of Behaviour in War* study, particularly in the emphasis on law over values, and suggests that a combination of the two, through formal and informal socialization mechanisms, would provide a broader basis on which to advocate for restraint.